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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
THE AUTHORIZATION CARD DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
There is probably no problem in the field of labor relations which is
more uncertain and controversial, at this point in time, than that of the
employer's obligation to bargain with a union when the employer is pre-
sented with authorization cards signed by a majority of his workers. The
amount of litigation concerning the several facets of this problem is
staggering, and there is no sign of abatement in sight. While it is always
perilous to arbitrarily select a point in time at which to evaluate the arti-
ficially arrested course of a turbulent and unrelenting stream of conflicting
administrative and judicial activity, the need for some kind of clarifica-
tion in this area justifies such an effort.
The broad dimensions of the problem are relatively clear. The focal
point is section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act which pro-
vides that " [i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (5) to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."' Section 9(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment .... 2
There are two methods by which a union may attain the status re-
quired under section 9(a). The first is through a secret ballot election
pursuant to section 9(c).3 Under this provision, a petition for such an
election may be filed by the union, the employees, or the employer. If
after hearing and investigation, the Board finds that a question of represen-
tation exists, 4 it will proceed to hold the election and certify the results.
The other way the union may become the exclusive representative
is through designation. The most common form of such designation
is through the use of cards authorizing the union to assume such a
representative status. The general rule, which received its classical
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
4. The general rule is that a question of representation exists when the union
involved has been designated by an initial showing of interest by at least 30% of the
employees. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1967). This designation must be kept distinct from
the designation involved when the demand is made upon the employer directly. If the
majority status of the union is clear, then the question shifts to the possibility of an8 (a) (5) violation. This is the primary focus of this study.
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expression in the Joy Silk" case, is that if a majority of employees desig-
nates a particular union as its bargaining representative, the employer
is under an immediate duty to bargain with such union, and unless he enter-
tains a good faith doubt of its majority status, his refusal to do so raises
the possibility of charges under section 8(a) (5). Even if the union's
majority is later lost as a result of other employer unfair labor practices,
an order to bargain with the union may be imposed as the remedy for the
original 8(a) (5) violation.6 If the union has a claim under 8(a) (5), it
does not waive this claim by waiting to file the charges until after an
election has been held.7
The basic problem with which this study is concerned is under what
circumstances the duty to bargain without an election will arise. This
problem can be broken down into two separate questions: (1) what a
union must do to establish the fact that it has been designated by a majority
of the employees in the appropriate unit8 and, (2) what an employer
must do when faced with such a showing. After these two questions have
been treated separately, various approaches to the solution of the base
problem will be examined in an effort to evaluate and predict the future
dimensions of the area.
II. THE PRESENTATION OF A VALID CARD MAJORITY
In the absence of an election, the obligation of an employer to rec-
ognize a union arises only when there is a demand for recognition that
is based on a validly obtained card majority. If a valid majority of signed
cards is not presented, the employer has an effective defense to an 8(a) (5)
charge. The greatest area of controversy concerning the employer's obli-
gation in this respect concerns the criterion for determining what is a
validly obtained card majority. The basic question that is presented is
whether the union has misrepresented the purpose of the cards10 to the
5. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), aff'd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1950). It must be noted that if the employer recognizes
a union which does not in fact represent a majority of its employees he may be held
to have impressed that agent upon a nonconsenting minority and thereby be guilty of
an 
8 (a) (1) violation. I.L.G.W.U. v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). In this connection,
see also Wall Street Journal, Mar. 12, 1968, at 18, col. 1.
6. See, e.g., Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).7. Bernel Foam Prod. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), overruling Aiello DairyFarms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954). It is important to note that the Bernel Foamdoctrine applies only when the election is set aside because of meritorious objections.If no such objections to the election can be raised, the results will stand undisturbed
and the union's 8(a) (5) claim will be waived. Koplin Bros. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1378(1964), enforced, 379 F.2d 488 (1967).8. The question of the appropriateness of the bargaining unit will not be con-
sidered. See, e.g., Southland Paint Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 22 (1965).9. The filing of a representation petition has been held not to be a demand for
recognition. L.B. Foster Co., 66 L.R.R.M. 1280 (NLRB 1967). Generally, however,there are few specific requirements concerning the form in which the demand is made.See, e.g., NLRB v. Rural Elec. Co., 296 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1961) ; NLRB v. Barney'sSupercenter, Inc., 296 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Lincoln Mfg. Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1866(1966), enforced, 382 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1967).
10. Of course, other forms of misrepresentation in connection with the solicitation
of cards have given rise to litigation. The Board, in general, allows the union wide
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signing employees. Specifically, the problem is whether the employees
have been misled into believing that the actual purpose of the cards was
to request an election rather than to designate the union as the immediate
bargaining agent.
This misrepresentation may take place in two separate ways: on the
face of the cards themselves or through oral representations made during
solicitation of the employee's signature. While these two areas might be
thought of as interdependent parts of the total circumstances surrounding
the employee's designation, they generally have been treated separately
by the Board," Further, the Board has held that where the employee's
subjective impression was that the cards were to be used solely for an
election instead of for immediate authorization, this is irrelevant in itself
to negate the overt act of signing the cards which indicate that representa-
tion is desired. 12 The standards surrounding the definition of the validly
obtained card majority consist rather of objective tests focusing on the
nature of the cards and the methods of their solicitation.
A. The Nature of the Cards
Where the purpose of the authorization card is completely mis-
represented on its face, such cards are held to be invalid if the existence
of a majority is at issue.13 On the other hand, where alternative purposes
are stated, one being authorization to act as immediate bargaining agent,
the Board has generally permitted the cards to be used. 14 The circuit
courts, however, are not in complete agreement on this question of dual
purpose cards. The Fifth Circuit has reversed an 8(a) (5) finding where
the union majority was based on cards stating a dual purpose.' 5 The
court held that the language of such cards was ambiguous and had the
effect of placing on the Board the burden of proving that the signer was
latitude in this respect. See, e.g., G & A Truck Line, Inc., 2 LAB. RSL. RnP. (67
L.R.R.M.) 1084 (NLRB Dec. 12, 1967); I.T.T. Semi-Conductors, Inc., 65 L.R.R.M.
1374 (NLRB 1967); John Kinkel & Son, 157 N.L.R.B. 744 (1966).
11. While this is generally true, the Board sometimes argues on appeal that the
fairness of representations made during the solicitation should compensate for am-
biguities in the wording of the cards or that clarity in the cards should compensate
for misleading representations. See NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1967) ; NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 830 (1965).
12. Henry I. Siegel, Inc., 65 L.R.R.M. 1505 (NLRB 1967). The Board does not
carry this position to its logical conclusion. Where the signers knew that the purpose
of the cards was immediate authorization, in spite of representations made to them
that the purpose was to obtain an election, the subjective state of mind was held to
validate the card majority. Yazoo Valley Elec. Power Ass'n, 65 L.R.R.M. 1030
(NLRB 1967).
13. NLRB v. Freeport Marble & Tile Co., 367 F.2d 371 (1st Cir. 1966) ; Bannon
Mills, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 611 (1964).
14. Lenz Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1399 (1965); S.N.C. Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 809(1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965) ; Winn-Dixie
Stores, 143 N.L.R.B. 848 (1963), enforced, 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 830 (1965).
15. NLRB v. Peterson, 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965).
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actually aware of the card's purpose. 16 The First Circuit has expressed
the view that:
[S]o long as the use of cards is countenanced as an alternative to an
election, there is the corresponding obligation on the part of the Board
and the unions, to make the cards as clear and straightforward and
as little susceptible to misinterpretation as possible.' 7
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has recently held that when a dual purpose
card is used, there is a greater obligation on the part of the union to make
sure that the employees are fully aware of the significance of their act in
signing.' s
On the other hand, the criticism of the dual purpose card has been
expressly rejected by some circuits. The Seventh Circuit, discussing this
problem, maintained:
The card expressly confers the requisite authority. The recital of
alternative methods by which the card might be used to make the au-
thority granted operative with respect to the employer in our opinion
neither negates the grant nor beclouds it with ambiguity. 19
The District of Columbia Circuit, faced with the same type of cards, agreed
that the cards were valid on their face, and that, absent a showing of
misrepresentation, the employer would not be able to inquire into the
subjective state of mind of those who signed.2 0
The problems created by this judicial and administrative inconsistency
and the resultant uncertainty affect counsel representing both union and
management. The problem of the union's attorney is in drafting the cards,
and the employer's problem is to ascertain their reliability. Both of these
difficulties are magnified by the fact that the circuits cannot agree on a
precise standard. Since what is involved is the written form rather than
the subtlety of the spoken word, there seems to be little reason for not
clarifying this area.
B. Union Representations During Solicitation
The state of the law concerning the nature of the cards themselves is
relatively placid compared with that surrounding representations made
16. Id. at 224. See also Judge Burger's concurring opinion in IUE v. NLRB,
352 F.2d 361, 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965).
17. NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Workers, 380 F.2d 851, 855 (1st Cir. 1967).
18. Dayco Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1967).
19. NLRB v. C.J. Glasgow Co., 356 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1966).
20. UAW v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966).
It must be noted that the cards involved in the Glasgow and UAW cases were much
less misleading in terms of the basic purpose than those which the Board has approved
in the past. See Lenz Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1399 (1965) ; S.N.C. Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B.
809 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965) ; Winn-
Dixie Stores, 143 N.L.R.B. 848 (1963), enforced, 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 830 (1965). The Glasgow and UAW cases involved cards which indicated
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during their solicitation. The basic doctrine that has created the turmoil
in this area is found in the Cumberland Shoe case.21 In that case, the
Board upheld the validity of solicitation in which the union represented that
one of the purposes of the cards was to obtain an election. By distinguishing
an earlier decision22 which invalidated cards when they were solicited
solely on this basis, the Board established the doctrine that a card majority
will be invalid only if, during the solicitation, the only purpose represented
was that of obtaining an election.23 As mentioned above, it is not relevant
that the individual signers thought that the cards were for the purpose of an
election so long as the cards were not solicited solely on that basis.24
While the Cumberland Shoe doctrine is essentially parallel to the rule
adopted by the Board concerning the face of the authorization cards, the
reaction from the circuit courts toward the former has been much more
violent. In a series of decisions within the past year directed at this ques-
tion, considerable uncertainty concerning the status of Cumberland Shoe
has been created.
A number of circuits have expressly rejected the Cumberland Shoe
doctrine. The Fourth Circuit has recently held in Crawford Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB 25 that, regardless of the fact that the cards may have been un-
ambiguous on their face, the central question in determining their validity
is whether the signers were free of any misapprehension with respect to
their purpose, and on this issue the Board has the burden of proof. The
Second Circuit also rejected Cumberland Shoe by holding that the decisive
question is whether the employees actually meant to make the union their
representative or merely intended to request an election.2 6 The Fifth
and Eighth Circuits, in earlier decisions, evidence a similar dislike of the
Cumberland Shoe approach. 27
Another tack that has been taken by some circuits is more subtle.
Rather than completely rejecting the Board's position, they have drastically
restated the contours of the doctrine. The Sixth Circuit, which had
affirmed the Cumberland Shoe case originally, stated:
We think it right now to say that we do not consider that we have
announced a rule that only where the solicitor of a card actually
employs the specified words "this card is for the sole and only purpose
of having an election", will a card be invalidated. We did not intend
such a narrow and mechanical rule. We believe that whatever the
21. 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enforced, 351 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965).
22. Englewood Lumber Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961).
23. 144 N.L.R.B. at 1269. The Cumberland Shoe doctrine has been consistently
followed by the Board. See Brandenburg Telephone Co., 65 L.R.R.M. 1183 (NLRB
1967); Montgomery Ward & Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1729 (1966); Gordon Mfg. Co., 158
N.L.R.B. 1303 (1966); Conren, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 592 (1966) ; Gotham Shoe Mfg.
Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 862 (1964), enforced, 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966).
24. See, e.g., Henry I. Siegel, Inc., 65 L.R.R.M. 1505 (NLRB 1967).
25. 386 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1967).
26. NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967).
27. Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967)
Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1966).
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style or actual words of the solicitation, if it is clearly calculated to
create in the mind of the one solicited a belief that the only purpose
of the cards is to obtain an election, an invalidation of such card does
not offend our Cumberland rule.28
The court stated further that the subjective intent of the signer is a rele-
vant consideration in determining whether the representation was "clearly
calculated" to create a false impression.29
This restatement of the Cumberland Shoe test was specifically fol-
lowed by the Seventh Circuit.3 0 The court there indicated that it preferred
to reinterpret and then follow the doctrine, rather than to adhere to the
original meaning and reject it as some of the other circuits had done. 31
Other circuits have followed the original Cumberland Shoe doctrine,
but with some reservations. The First Circuit recently stated: "Without
going so far as to say that a misrepresentation cannot ever vitiate a card
when it is not proffered as a sole reason for signing, we have no hesitation
in saying that here the representation that there would be an election does
not invalidate . . . [the] card."' 32 Further, the court uses the term "hard
sell" to characterize the type of solicitation necessary to vitiate an em-
ployee's card, thus indicating a slight retreat from the mechanical ap-
proach.33 The District of Columbia Circuit, while specifically adhering to
Cumberland Shoe, as originally interpreted, maintained that the doctrine
was merely a rule of thumb and would not be applied in cases of "gross
misstatement.
3 4
At the present time it is uncertain to what degree the validity of an
authorization card majority will be determined by the objective, mechani-
cal tests adopted by the Board or by the more subjective, total impression
test advocated by many of the circuits.3 5 The great amount of uncertainty
concerning this question demands clarification. Recently, a petition to
grant certiorari was filed in the Crawford case,3 6 and it can well be hoped
that a solution to the problem will be forthcoming from the Supreme Court.
28. NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 384 F.2d 609, 618 (6th Cir. 1967).
29. Id. at 617.
30. NLRB v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 2 LAB. R4L. RtP. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2278 (7th
Cir. Jan. 12, 1968).
31. The reason for the approach taken by the court was probably to avoid over-
ruling the controlling precedent of Happach v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1965).
32. NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Workers, 380 F.2d 851, 855-56 (lst
Cir. 1967).
33. Id. at 855.
34. UAW v. NLRB, 66 L.R.R.M. 2548, 2552 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
35. A separate problem which has recently received some attention is the effect
misrepresentation with respect to one card will have on the entire showing. While
it has been the general rule that the effect will extend only to the particular card
involved, proof of a pattern of misrepresentation may result in placing the burden
on the Board to show that the other signers were unaffected. See Bryant Chucking
Grinder Co. v. NLRB, 2 LAB. REL. Rep. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2017, 2021 (concurring
opinion) (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 1967) ; NLRB v. Golub Corp., 66 L.R.R.M. 2769 (2d Cir.
1967). For a discussion favoring this approach see Lesnick, Establishment of Bargain-
ing Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MICH. L. Rev. 851, 857-58 (1967).
36. 386 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S.
Jan. 25, 1968) (No. 1050). For a proposed solution see p. 581 infra.
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III. THE EMPLOYER'S DOUBT
Once the union confronts the employer with a validly obtained card
majority and demands recognition, the employer is obligated to recognize
and bargain with that union unless he entertains a good faith doubt of the
union's majority status. 7 The question that obviously arises pertains to
the application and explication of this test. A precise definition of the
good faith doubt standard is impossible since the existence of the good faith
doubt is determined in light of all of the relevant factors in the case.
88
In addition to the presence of numerous factors bearing on the question in
each case, there is great variation among the courts, and even in some
Board decisions, concerning which factors are to be accepted as relevant.
The approach that will be taken, therefore, is to separately analyze those
factors which are generally considered relevant and to attempt to arrive
at a workable definition through the structuring of the process of proof
involved.
The most important factor in the decisional process of determining
whether or not recognition was mandated is that the burden is on the
Board to prove lack of good faith.3 9 In a sense, therefore, the standard
is defined by what the Board must prove to sustain its burden. For the
purpose of analysis, the types of evidence which are generally used may
be broken down into three categories. The first concerns the direct asser-
tions made by the employer indicating his attitude toward the union's
demand. The second concerns the implication of lack of good faith which
may arise from the employer's attitude toward investigation of the union's
alleged majority. The final category involves the controversial question
of the use of employer unfair labor practices to demonstrate lack of good
faith.
A. The Employer's Assertion
The assertion of a doubt by the employer is, of course, essential to a
successful defense to an 8(a) (5) charge, 40 and a delay in the assertion of
the doubt may be considered evidence of lack of any doubt at all.41 Where
the employer recognizes and begins bargaining with the union before
asserting a doubt, this generally will be held to be affirmative evidence
of an actual lack of a good faith doubt. 42 Moreover, where the employer
37. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), aff'd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1950).
38. Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154
N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965).
39. NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 346 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1965).
40. See, e.g., NLRB v. Idaho Elec. Co., 384 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1967) ; NLRB v.
Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 379 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Joy Silk Mills,
Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), aff'd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
914 (1950).
41. Local 1179, Retail Clerks v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Lifetime
Door Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 13, 15 (1966), enforced, 2 LAB. REL. Rep. (67 L.R.R.M.)
2704 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 1968).
42. NLRB v. Mutual Indus., Inc., 382 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1967). It appears that
a prior bargaining relationship shifts the ultimate burden of proof to the employer.
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substantiates his asserted good faith doubt by reasons other than the lack
of an existing union majority, for example, doubts as to the NLRB's
jurisdiction,43 the appropriateness of the proposed unit,44 and even where
the employer considers the signers to be independent contractors, 45 the
general rule seems to be that no defense to the 8(a) (5) charge can be
mustered, and that, with respect to such doubts, the employer acts at his
peril in refusing to recognize the union.46
The really significant question, however, is whether the mere assertion
of a good faith doubt is sufficient to fulfill the employer's initial obligation
or whether it is necessary for him to demonstrate a reasonable basis for
such doubt as well. This ultimately is a question of burden of proof
because such evidence is often used by the employer in the presentation of
his case.47 Evidence indicating the basis for the employer's doubt may
include a past history of election losses by the union involved 48 and informa-
tion gained by the employer concerning the sentiments of particular
employees. 49 However, it must be remembered that such evidence will not
be considered if the election losses were the result of, or the information
gathering resulted in, unfair labor practices by the employer.Y0
It would seem reasonably clear that since the Board has the ultimate
burden of proof on the issue of good faith doubt,51 the employer is initially
required merely to assert such doubt ;52 however, there has been some
language to the contrary. The Seventh Circuit is clear on this point: "To
be 'fair' or in 'good faith' doubt must have a rational basis in fact."51 3
See H & W Constr. Co., 63 L.R.R.M. 1346 (NLRB 1966). One commentator has
suggested that the only time a bargaining order based on a card majority should beissued, absent other unfair labor practices, is when the employer's doubt is asserted
after substantive bargaining has commenced. See Comment, Labor Law - Employer's
Good Faith Doubt of Union's Majority, 27 LA. L. Rev. 564 (1967).
43. H & W Constr. Co., 63 L.R.R.M. 1346 (NLRB 1966).
44. Southland Paint Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 22 (1965).45. Steel City Transp. v. NLRB, 2 LAB. RSL. RimP. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2589 (3d Cir.
Feb. 21, 1968).
46. Where the employer's doubt concerning his duty to bargain results from thefact that a valid election had been held within the preceding year, his position is not
clear. The issue seemed to have been settled contrary to the employer's position byConren, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 59, enforced, 368 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 386U.S. 974 (1966). However, a later Board decision, Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1185(1966), seemingly allowed the prior election to serve as a defense to the 8(a)(5)
charges.
47. See, e.g., NLRB v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 387 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1967) ; Peoples
Serv. Drug Stores v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Great At. &
Pac. Tea Co., 346 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1965).
48. Wausau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Johnnie's Poultry Co., 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965).
49. NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 346 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1965); Cedar
Hills Theatre, Inc., 67 L.R.R.M. 1076 (NLRB 1967). But see NLRB v. Economy
Food Center, 333 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1964).
50. NLRB v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 387 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1967); Cedar Hills
Theatre, Inc., 67 L.R.R.M. 1076 (NLRB 1967).
51. Cases cited note 39 supra.
52. The consistently expressed viewpoint that authorization cards are inherently
unreliable would indicate that no further substantiation of the employer's good faith
doubt is required, at least initially. See NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d
562, 566 (4th Cir. 1967); Pizza Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 369 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
53. NLRB v. C.J. Glasgow Co., 356 F.2d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 1966).
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The Second Circuit is less explicit: "If we should assume, which we do
without deciding, that an employer relying on good faith doubt of a union's
majority, while not bearing the ultimate burden of proof, must come for-
ward with some evidence of a reason, that was done here."
54
Nevertheless, the general rule would seem to be that the employer's
mere assertion would be enough to satisfy any initial burden, and that
evidence supporting the employer's doubt is essential only after the Board
has presented a prima facie case.
B. Investigation of the Union's Claim
Diverse problems arise concerning the question of investigation into
the union's claim of a majority, and the way that an employer's reaction
to that problem may be used as evidence to determine the existence or lack
of a good faith doubt. Two forms of investigation must be kept distinct.
The card check involves the mechanical process of checking the signa-
tures on the cards against those of the employees while the general
investigation entails the polling of employees with respect to their
signatures.
In the area of card checks, it has been held that the refusal of an
employer to abide by the results of a card check performed by a neutral
third party is enough to demonstrate a lack of good faith doubt.
55 How-
ever, the Board has recently held that a repudiation of an agreement to
submit to a card check was not enough, standing by itself, to demon-
strate such an attitude. 56 Moreover, a refusal to accept an offer of proof
at the time a demand for recognition is made is generally considered as
some evidence of a lack of a good faith doubt.5 7 But again, it is very
questionable whether, standing alone, such evidence will justify a finding
to that effect.58 Language in a recent Second Circuit decision, TWU v.
NLRB,5 9 raises a question concerning the propriety of using a refusal
to accept an offer of proof as evidence at all. The Court pointed out that
it is perfectly consistent to concede the technical validity of the cards
while still maintaining a doubt that the cards are reliable indicators of
employee sentiment.60
54. TWU v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1967).
55. Fred Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), aff'd, 308 F.2d 687 (9th
Cir. 1962).
56. United Buckingham Freight Lines, 66 L.R.R.M. 1357 (NLRB 1967). In
addition to the absence of any other indications of lack of good faith doubt, the Board
pointed out the employer's willingness to deal with the same union as the representa-
tive of other employees. Therefore, this decision may be distinguished in the future
on this particular fact.
57. NLRB v. Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1967) ; NLRB v. Wit-
beck, 382 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1967) ; NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co.,
379 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1967).
58. Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1187 (1966).
59. 386 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1967).
60. Id. at 793. The court's opinion suggests the importance of distinguishing the
card check and a general investigation. Although the question has not arisen, pre-
sumably refusal of a union's request to have the employees interrogated would be
stronger evidence of a lack of good faith.
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A coincident problem arises when the employer has made a general
investigation himself and has discovered that the union in fact did have
a majority. A showing of this nature has been held to support a con-
tention of a lack of good faith doubt. 61 The Board, apparently, is not
inclined to take this position to its logical conclusion. It has recently
been held by the Board that if the results of an employer poll were
favorable to his position, these would not be considered sufficient to
justify the employer's contention of good faith doubt.62
Finally, there is some indication that a failure on the part of the
employer to make an investigation on his own initiative may be some
evidence of lack of doubt. In a recent Fourth Circuit decision it was
stated :
If, upon receipt of a union's claim of a majority and a demand for
recognition, an employer does nothing, his inaction may be some
indication that he has no doubt of the union's majority status ...
The natural response of an employer entertaining real doubt of the
union's claim is an affirmative, investigatory one. 68
As pointed out by that decision, however, such investigatory conduct
may result in an 8(a) (1) violation, and, therefore, the employer's inaction
may be caused by fear of such a charge. 64 Where the employer does
engage in investigatory conduct which does not amount to an unfair
labor practice, such conduct is not only not considered evidence of a
lack of good faith doubt, but may actually be used to support a finding
that the employer's doubts are in good faith.
65
The above discussion is intended only to catalogue some of the ques-
tions which may arise during the consideration of the problem of good
faith doubt. The subheadings of "Employer Assertion" and "Investi-
gation" are but convenient devices to organize some of the factors involved.
C. The Use of Unfair Labor Practices as Evidence
The controversy surrounding the use of subsequent unfair labor
practices as evidence of lack of good faith goes to the fundamental
approach utilized in determining the appropriateness of a bargaining order.
The Board's position is that the commission of independent unfair labor
practices by the employer should be used as evidence of lack of good
faith doubt.66 While the finding of such unfair labor practices had in
61. NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d 551, 557 (4th Cir. 1967) ; NLRB
v. Tom's Supermarket, Inc., 385 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1967) ; Jem Mfg., Inc., 156
N.L.R.B. 643, 645 (1966).
62. Oleson's Food Stores, 66 L.R.R.M. 1108 (NLRB 1967).
63. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 567 (4th Cir. 1967). For
the Board's position to the contrary, see John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 99 (1965),
ree'd and remanded sub. nomn., Local 1179, Retail Clerks, 376 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1967).
64. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 567 (4th Cir. 1967).
65. Don the Beachcomber v. NLRB, 2 LAB. RL. Rim. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2551
(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1968).
66. Copeland Oil Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 126 (1966); Samual B. Gass, 154 N.L.R.B.
728 (1965); Frantz & Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1965).
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the past operated as a per se determination of lack of good faith, 67 the
Board presently looks to all of the facts involved before making any
such determination. 68 Further, not all unfair labor practices are used
as evidence. The rule is that, to be considered in connection with the lack
of good faith doubt, the unlawful activity must be substantial and calcu-
lated to dissipate the union's majority.69
The Board's approach has been adopted by the majority of the
circuit courts which have considered the question. 70 However, two recent
circuit court decisions have raised interesting questions concerning the
interpretation and the propriety of the Board's position. In NLRB v.
River Togs, Inc., 71 the Second Circuit refused to enforce a bargaining
order based on an 8(a)(5) violation on the grounds that a lack of good
faith had not been established. In addition to disputing the Board's
findings with respect to certain unfair labor practice charges, the court
maintained that evidence of unfair labor practices consisting of an "ex-
tensive antiunion campaign" and discriminatory layoffs was irrelevant:
"But apart from that [the invalidation of certain Board findings] we
see no logical basis for the view that substantial evidence of good faith
doubt is negated solely by an employer's desire to thwart unionization
whether by proper or even by improper means. '72 While the court based
this statement on evidence affirmatively substantiating the employer's
good faith doubt,73 the court's approach, as indicated by other language
in the opinion, is much broader. For example, the court quotes the fol-
lowing statement made by Judge Learned Hand concerning the use of
unfair labor practices to demonstrate lack of good faith: "As a penalty it
might be proper, but as a link in reasoning it seems to be immaterial. '7 4
The court then interpreted the Board's basic approach in this area
as an attempt to find the most reliable method for ascertaining employee
sentiment. It characterized the Board's examination of unfair labor
practices more in terms of an effort to discern the appropriateness of a
bargaining order as a remedy for such practices, rather than as evidence
of lack of good faith doubt. Therefore, if a bargaining order is to be
imposed, the court concludes, it must be because the 8(a) (1) violations are
67. See Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALP L.J. 805, 814 (1966).
68. Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965). But see Comment,
supra note 67, at 815, for the view that the Board still uses the per se approach.
69. E.g., Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
70. NLRB v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 387 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1967); UAW v. NLRB,
66 L.R.R.M. 2552 (D.C. Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F.2d 842 (9th
Cir. 1967) ; American Sanitary Prod. Co. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1967)
NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 379 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1967).
71. 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967).
72. Id. at 206-07.
73. The evidence consisted of an antiunion petition, indications of gifts received
by the signers, and the fact that some of the signers were Polish-speaking. Id. at 204-07.
74. Id. at 207, quoting NLRB v. James Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743, 746
(1953). See also Lesnick, supra note 35, at 858.
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so serious as to make a bargaining order an appropriate remedy.75
Although this court has made it clear, in a later opinion, that unfair
labor practices may be used as some evidence of a lack of good faith
doubt,76 the Second Circuit appears committed to the policy of looking
to unfair labor practices primarily in terms of the appropriateness of the
remedy to be imposed.
The Fourth Circuit also takes a position against the use of independent
unfair labor practices as evidence of lack of good faith doubt. In NLRB
v. S.S. Logan Packing Co.,77 the court held that investigatory conduct vio-
lative of 8(a) (1) would not negate the employer's claim of good faith
doubt because such conduct was not of any probative value on that issue.
While the court recognized that extreme conduct may support an inference
of lack of good faith,78 it contended that in most situations the opposite
is true.
A finding of a § 8(a) (1) violation out of such investigatory
conduct of an employer tends to confirm his claim of a good faith
doubt of the union's majority; it has no tendency to negate it ...
[I]n typical cases, subsequent unfair labor practices have a tendency
to prove only the employer's opposition to the union's organizational
effort; they throw no light on his belief or disbelief of the union's claim
of majority status.7 9
While it is possible that in the future the Board will adopt the ap-
proach outlined by the Second Circuit and view the commission of inde-
pendent unfair labor practices primarily as grounds for the issuance of a
bargaining order rather than as evidence of lack of good faith doubt, it is
clear that such an approach is not reflected in current Board policy.80
Further, it must be recognized that if the Second Circuit approach receives
additional judicial acceptance, the Board will be more reluctant to issue a
bargaining order, thereby greatly curtailing the use of the bargaining order
as a remedy.
Although the approach of the Board at present is that to be used as
evidence of lack of good faith doubt, independent unfair labor practices
must be substantial,8 ' as a practical matter, almost any such activity is
75. 382 F.2d at 207-08. In this case, the court held that a bargaining order would
be inappropriate because the violations were too insignificant. See also NLRB v.
Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
76. See NLRB v. United Mineral Corp., 2 LAB. RIL. R4P. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2343(2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1968).
77. 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967).
78. Such extreme conduct was found to be present in NLRB v. Lifetime DoorCo., 2 LAB. RYL. RiP. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2704 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 1968).
79. 386 F.2d at 568.
80. See generally Address by H. Stephan Gordon, Associate General Counsel of
the NLRB, Federal Bar Association and the George Washington University National
Law Center Labor Relations Institute, in Washington, D.C., Feb. 15, 1968 (Reprinted
in 1 LAB. REL. RSP., News and Background Information Section 165 (Feb. 19, 1968)).
It must be remembered that the issuance of a bargaining order based on 8 (a) (1)
violations alone has always been available as a possible alternative open to the Board.See Oleson's Food Stores, 66 L.R.R.M. 1108 (NLRB 1967).
81. E.g., Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
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used as strong, if not conclusive, evidence against the employer.8 2 Once
the finding of lack of good faith doubt is made, "the bargaining order can
be routinely imposed and sustained as the obvious remedy for an unlawful
refusal to bargain. 83
A bargaining order based on the River Togs rationale is a different
matter. Since the focus under this rationale is shifted to the question of
the appropriate remedy, the Board "would need to persuade the courts of
appeals that the stronger remedy was not chosen routinely or simply as a
deterrent, but was appropriate in light of the specific setting of the
particular acts of illegality involved. '8 4 The Board would, therefore, be
more careful in ordering bargaining if the River Togs approach were
adopted by the other circuits. Further, the risk of saddling a group of
employees with a minority union is increased where, as in River Togs, the
bargaining order, if issued, would be based on 8(a) (1) violations alone.
Under the traditional approach, the risk involved was that the union did
not enjoy a majority status at the time the bargaining order was issued;
under the new approach a bargaining order may be imposed notwithstand-
ing the fact that a majority never existed.8 5
IV. SOME APPROACHES TOWARDS SOLUTION
Having briefly reviewed the current state of the law in this area,
it is appropriate to examine some of the possible approaches to solution
of the problem. These approaches will be divided into three general
categories: the "absolute right to an election," the "most appropriate
remedy," and the "good faith doubt."
A. The Absolute Right to an Election
A strong suggestion that the employer has an absolute right to insist
on an election as a means of resolving questions of representation is found
in the Logan Packing case. 6 The court first argued that section 9(c),
prior to 1947, had provided that the Board was empowered to decide
questions of representation by a secret ballot election, or by "any other
suitable means." Since the latter phrase has been omitted in the Taft-
Hartley Amendments, the only means available to resolve questions of
representation is the election. 7 To further buttress this argument the
court referred to the majority and minority reports8 and the 1947 addition
82. See Comment, supra note 67, at 814-15.
83. Lesnick, supra note 35, at 858.
84. Id. at 860.
85. See NLRB v. United Mineral Corp., 2 LAB. R4L. RAP. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2343,
2349 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1968).
86. 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967).
87. Id. at 569.
88. The court pointed out that the Minority Report suggestion that the Board
might have discretion to dismiss an employer's election petition if there were no doubt
that the union did represent a majority of employees was completely rejected by
Congress in the final enactment. Id. at 570.
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of section 9(c) (1) (B), 89 which permits the employer, as well as the union,
to petition for an election; these references were offered as further indica-
tions of the legislative intent to allow the employer to insist on an election.90
As the court itself recognized, section 9(c) does not come into play
unless a question of representation exists for the Board to resolve. But
the court concluded: "A question concerning representation exists, how-
ever, when a determination of the union's status and the employer's doubt
of it is dependent upon a choice of dubious or debatable inferences arising
from disputable, or even undisputable, evidentiary facts." 91
When this statement is added to the lengthy indictment of the reli-
ability of authorization cards contained earlier in the court's opinion,92
the position of the Fourth Circuit appears to be that a question of repre-
sentation always exists whenever a demand is made on the basis of
authorization cards.93 This position is circuitous. The court is willing to
allow the employer, by asserting a good faith doubt, to raise the question of
representation - which in turn gives him the right to avoid litigation on
the very issue of good faith doubt. By assuming the existence of a question
of representation whenever the employer asserts one, the court is in effect
vitiating the traditional position that properly obtained and drafted au-
thorization cards constitute a proper basis for recognition and bargaining.94
Even if the assumption of the Logan court were correct, it is far from
clear that section 9(c) applies exclusively to cases in which a question of
representation exists. As Judge Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit has pointed
out, 9(c) is the exclusive method whereby certification may be obtained,
but nowhere does the statute limit a union to that method for obtaining
representative status, whether or not a question of representation exists."
In fact, an examination of the language of section 9(a) supports the
opposite inference, since the section indicates that the representatives with
whom the employer must bargain under 8(a) (5) are those who are
"designated" or "selected." While selection of the representative is accom-
89. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (B) (1964).90. The addition of section 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964), in 1947, to insure the
expression of employer's views might also be used to support the position of the
Fourth Circuit in Logan.
91. 386 F.2d at 569.
92. Id. at 565-66,
93. A subsequent Fourth Circuit decision, NLRB v. Lifetime Door Co., 2 LAB.RSL. Rip. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2704 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 1968), indicates a possible retreatfrom the position taken in Logan. In that decision, Judge Sobeloff, who had previously
severely criticized the Logan rationale in NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d551, 555 (4th Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion), affirmed, without citing Logan, a Boardfinding that where the employer made no assertion of a good faith doubt and where
the commission of serious unfair labor practices indicated a clear lack of such doubt,
the employer had violated section 8(a) (5). The case is not necessarily inconsistent
with Logan, since the employer in the former had not even filed an election petition;however, a movement from Logan may be precursed by Lifetime Door.94. The Second Circuit has indicated that this is the effect of the Logan case.See NLRB v. United Mineral Corp., 2 LAB. R]L. R]s'. (67 L.R.R.M.) 2343, 2347
n.10 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 1968).
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plished through section 9(c)'s secret election, designation is accomplished
through the authorization card procedure. 96
Whatever the merits of the argument for establishing the employer's
absolute right to an election, it seems reasonably clear that such a right
will have to be created by new legislation rather than through interpreta-
tion of the existing Act. Such legislation has recently been proposed by
Senator Fannin of Arizona.9 7 The Fannin Bill would amend section 9(a)
to provide that the only bargaining representative with whom the employer
is required to bargain under 8(a) (5) shall be one who has been certified
by the Board as a result of an election conducted in accordance with 9(c).
In addition, section 10(c) would be amended to provide that no bargaining
order shall be issued by the Board unless the union is so certified. 98
There are several arguments to support the Fannin Bill. The first
argument, which has already been considered, is that the courts have
misconstrued the original legislative intent on this point, and, therefore,
new legislation is necessary to correct the error.99 Support for this approach
can also be premised on an interpretation of the first amendment. As long
as the employer is under a threat of a bargaining order, in the absence of
or in spite of an election, he is not really free to express his views. 10 0
However, since a bargaining order would be issued only after either an
improper refusal to bargain or acts of interference or coercion, all of
which constitute the commission of unfair labor practices under the Act,
the first amendment problem does not seem to be a serious one. 1 1
Another obvious argument supporting the Fannin proposal is that
authorization cards are inherently unreliable. There can be little question
that the standards surrounding the proper nature of the cards and their
solicitation are in severe need of renovation. However, even if the stand-
ards were radically changed to test the validity of the card majority more
stringently, the reliability argument has a deeper and more persuasive
aspect. The employee is not in a position to make a truly free and reasoned
choice, as desired by the Act, unless he is afforded the opportunity of
hearing the employer's views; if recognition is required upon presentation
of the card majority, the employer has no opportunity to interact in the
employee's decision. This argument has a great deal of merit. However,
the Fannin proposal, by prohibiting the use of the bargaining order, does
not adequately take cognizance of the possibility of the commission of
96. This contention has been answered by interpreting the term "designation" to
apply to the single union election and confining "selected" to the multi-union situation.
See Comment, supra note 67, at 821. There is, however, no indication that such an
approach has or will be accepted.
97. S. 22, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
98. There is no indication that any action has been taken on the bill to date.
99. See pp. 576-77 supra.
100. See Comment, supra note 67, at 840.
101. But see id. at 840. The position is taken that first amendment problems exist
whenever a bargaining order is based on the use of authorization cards as a means of
obtaining the status of bargaining representative.
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unfair labor practices by the employer during the campaign. This omission
may actually allow the destruction of the "reasoned choice" it was de-
signed to protect. When employer unfair labor practices have been
committed during the campaign, the ability of the employee to make a
reasoned choice is significantly open to doubt, and the Fannin proposal
would leave no alternative but a re-run election.
B. The Most Reliable Method Approach
The approach which focuses on ascertaining what is the most reliable
method of determining the employees' desires comes in two varieties. One
is that exemplified by the River Togs case. In River Togs, unfair labor
practices were considered not in terms of the traditional good faith doubt
approach, but rather in terms of the appropriateness of the remedy to be
applied. The second approach is that contained in a bill proposed by
Senator Javits of New York.10 2 The bill would amend section 9(c) to
provide for an expedited election in those cases in which a demand for
recognition is made, unless unfair labor practices are committed during
the campaign. If unfair labor practices are committed, the employer may
be subject to an 8(a) (5) violation.103
While the Javits Bill, like River Togs, views the problem of the pro-
priety of the bargaining order more in terms of its appropriateness as
a remedy than in terms of whether or not a good faith doubt ever
existed, it is important to remember that the only time the question of
appropriateness of remedies is raised is when unfair labor practices are
committed. Otherwise, the two approaches are at opposite ends of the
spectrum. The Javits Bill would provide for an election as the general
rule and, therefore, can be seen as closer to the Fannin approach, with
a remedy provided for the latter's most serious defect. River Togs, on
the other hand, assumes the traditional Joy Silk test but makes one major
exception to the traditional interpretation of that test in the case of unfair
labor practices, and greatly limits the extent to which that test will be used.
The Javits Bill, by curing the most objectionable aspect of the Fannin
Bill - the unavailability of the bargaining order as a remedy - presents
the most acceptable statement of the right to an election approach, and
perhaps the most appropriate solution to the problem itself. The arguments
against this approach must be supported by a showing of the positive
aspects of the traditional requirements of bargaining unless there is a
good faith doubt. One such advantage, of course, is the saving of time and
102. S. 2395, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
103. The bill would also amend section 8 to provide that a refusal to recognize
a union presenting a card majority is an unfair labor practice if the employer has no
good faith doubt of the majority status of the union and has not filed a petition for
election under section 9(1) (B). Although this part of the bill would give the
employer an absolute right to an election, it would be quite difficult to interpret this
as being the exclusive statement of the employer's obligations in this area, and there-
fore it should be read in conjunction with the proposed amendment to section 9(c).
See Comment, supra note 67, at 890.
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administrative effort that results from the requirement of immediate bar-
gaining. While the Javits Bill would provide for an expedited election,
the bargaining order would unquestionably remain the most efficient
method of handling the problem. Another argument is that the immediate
bargaining approach fosters one of the basic policies of the Act, i.e., the
promotion of the right to self-organization; to bypass this approach is to
run counter to this basic policy. It must be remembered, however, that
underlying the right to self-organization is the right to freely select a
bargaining representative, and to the extent that the new approach makes
possible a more reasoned choice, it would seem that the overall policy
of the Act would be furthered. Only if it can be said that the policy of
spreading unionism was the overriding policy of the Act, can the approach
suggested in the Javits Bill be considered basically conflicting, and, after
the 1947 Amendments, this can hardly be said to be the case.'
If, however, legislation in this area is not forthcoming, a solution
will have to be attempted by the courts. Adoption of the "most reliable
method" approach by the Board and the courts would eliminate the prob-
lem of making a specific fact determination with respect to the presence
or absence of a good faith doubt. There are indications that the Board
may very well be moving towards this position ;105 however, before resort
to this approach is taken, a re-evaluation of the more traditional process
of analysis is in order.
C. The Good Faith Doubt Approach
Two requirements must be met before the immediate duty to bargain
arises. These are that the union must present a validly obtained card
majority and that the employer lack a good faith doubt regarding the
union's majority status. With respect to the first, it has been seen that
the Board's burden of meeting the standard of validity is relatively light.
On the other hand, the difficulty of proving lack of good faith is quite
substantial, 10 6 and if the use of independent unfair labor practices is
limited, as suggested in River Togs, it will be even more difficult. 10 7
This situation is exactly the opposite of what it should be.
104. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61
HARV. L. RiV. 1, 44 (1947).
105. This seems to be the position taken in a recent address by the Associate
General Counsel of the Board. See Address by H. Stephan Gordon, supra note 80,
at 182. Mr. Gordon also pointed out that, at present, the imposition of a bargaining
order is not at all a common occurrence. During fiscal year 1967, only 107 bargaining
orders were issued compared with the 8183 elections which were conducted. Id. at 166.
See also Frito-Lay, Inc., 2 LAB. RL. Rim (67 L.R.R.M.) 1313 (NLRB Feb. 16, 1968),
in which the Board considered the case from the viewpoint of the "most appropriate
remedy" as well as the traditional good faith doubt approach.
106. The difficulty of proving a negative is substantial in itself. In addition to this,
the means whereby the Board is able to do so are severely limited. See pp. 570-73 supra.
107. It is interesting to note that 102 of the 107 bargaining orders issued in 1967
involved the commission of independent employer unfair labor practices. See Address
by H. Stephan Gordon, supra note 80, at 166.
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First of all, there is no reason at all not to require more stringent
standards for the language of the cards and for the process of their
solicitation. The Board could very easily prescribe a standard form for
authorization cards, or, if this is thought to be excessive interference
with the union's affairs, it might at least set forth more adequate minimum
standards.'08 Considering the importance of the matter, it does not
seem unreasonable to require the union to use separate cards for au-
thorization and for election.'0 9 Further, the mechanical Cumberland Shoe
test should be abandoned entirely in favor of an approach assessing all
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the solicitation, including the
form of the cards themselves, with a view toward determining the question
of whether the signers were misled with respect to the significance of
their authorization.
The stricter standards suggested would have the effect of enhancing
the reliability of authorization cards and of making the existence of a
good faith doubt on the part of the employer less likely. This fact, coupled
with the great difficulty of proof, dictates that in the future, demonstration
of certain objective factors should result in the creation of a presumption
which will shift the burden to the employer to substantiate his good faith
doubt.
The factors that should be considered in order to determine the
existence of the presumption of validity may be open to debate, but two
factors seem particularly relevant to this question. The first is the per-
centage showing of the union. A study has been made indicating that the
greater the majority of authorization cards, the greater the likelihood of a
union victory, and certainly this factor should be given more weight than
it has been given in the past.110 The second pertinent consideration is the
ease with which the employer can investigate the union's claim of majority
status. The major factor in this respect would be the number of em-
ployees involved, but, in addition, other factors concerning the question
of feasibility of investigation may also be considered. This approach
would have the effect of placing an affirmative duty to investigate on
the employer under certain circumstances where he is in a position to
make a determination of majority status himself.
This restructuring of the process of determining good faith doubt
has two advantages. First, it relates the question of good faith doubt more
directly to the question of reliability by requiring a more objective assess-
108. This could be done through the rule-making powers of the Board. For an
excellent discussion of the failure of the Board to adequately use such powers, seePeck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board,
70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
109. For a more specific proposal in this regard, see Lewis, The Use and Abuse
of Authorization Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16 LAB. L.J. 434, 440-41(1966).
110. See 1962 ABA PROCEEDINGS SEC'TION op LABOR IULATIONS LAW 14-17.
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ment of both."' Second, the emphasis on the concept of lack of good
faith will shift from the notion that the employer is certain of the union's
majority to the notion that he is completely unconcerned with the question
as evidenced by his failure to substantiate his good faith doubt through
investigation. To the extent that the concept of lack of good faith is
altered to reflect an attitude of reckless disregard as well as of complete
certainty, that concept will become more meaningful and workable. 1 12
V. CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this exposition has demonstrated the need for re-
evaluation and clarification in this area. At present, unions have little
to guide them in making a determination of what is necessary to impose
an immediate duty to bargain upon the employer. Similarly, employers
have few guidelines for determining their statutory obligations once a
demand for recognition is made.
As suggested above, the most desirable solution may well be the
establishment of the right to an election in all cases, with the safeguard
of the bargaining order where necessary. If this is to be accomplished, it
must be done by the legislators. If the problem is to be solved judicially,
it is essential that the determination of the obligation to bargain without
an election be as closely related to the question of the reliability of the
cards as possible.
Michael F. Rosenblum
111. In a sense, this is the logical outcome of the River Togs approach. By de-
emphasizing subsequent employer activity in making a determination with respect to
a lack of good faith, the focus is shifted to the factors surrounding the actual demand
and the employer's attitude at that time.
112. One result of this approach is that the practice of imposing a bargaining
order solely on the basis of unfair labor practices committed during a campaign would
be almost eliminated. This would follow because the adjudication of the question of
good faith doubt would be more closely related to that of reliability, and a showing
of the former would leave the court with less of a basis to say that the union ever did
represent the majority choice. As long as the remedies were available for exceptional
circumstances, this limitation would be another advantage of the new approach.
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